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From Planning to Opportunism? Re-Examining the Creation of the London Docklands Development 
Corporation 
Sue Brownill, Oxford Brookes University 
Glen O’Hara, Oxford Brookes University 
Abstract 
East London’s former docklands have been at the centre of planning and regeneration debates for 
the past four decades. The setting up of the LDDC has been variously interpreted as ‘3-D 
Thatcherism’ in action, a symbol of the death of comprehensive planning and the replacement of a 
corporatist, Keynesian era of urban policy with a more neo-liberal approach. Moving away from 
simplistic and straightforward interpretations of the processes happening at this time, this paper 
uses new archival and interview material to re-examine the setting up of the LDDC and its early 
years, revealing a more complex and contradictory picture than existing accounts suggest. It focuses 
on three themes: changing forms of state intervention; the uncertain ‘break’ in the post-war 
consensus as evidenced by the changes in approaches to the regeneration of Docklands; and the 
unintended, disordered process of actual policy change. As such we aim to reveal  how shifting 
visions, modes of governance and practices can compete and co-exist in the midst of seemingly 
coherent ‘eras’, as Docklands as a place and as an approach to regeneration was constantly made 
and re-made – a process that continues to this day.   
Introduction: Planning the Future of the Docklands Area 
The history of the London docklands’ redevelopment is a broadly familiar one of industrial decline 
and the varied responses that this has elicited.1 The upstream docks began to close in 1967 as larger 
ships and containerisation led to trade moving gradually down-river to Tilbury: over a three year 
period the East India, St Katherine and London docks closed, followed by the Millwall and West India 
Docks in 1980 and the Royal Docks further downstream in 1981 (See Map 1).2 A succession of visions 
and projects were then put forward for how the resultant redundant spaces could be redeveloped.3 
As Peter Walker, Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment, said in 1972 at the launch of a 
major Docklands regeneration study: ‘all the ingredients are here for something big to happen’ (see 
Table 1 for a summary of political control of the relevant authorities).4 However, what that 
‘something’ should be and how it was to be achieved was hotly contested, with alternative visions 
and strategies being put forward by a range of interests: as we shall demonstrate, there was nothing 
inevitable about that ‘something big’ equating to the towers of Canary Wharf. 
In 1971 central government made its first response to the decline of the enclosed docks and for the 
first time designated an area on a map called London Docklands when Walker announced his 
intention to set up the Docklands Study Team. Central government wanted to co-ordinate the 
piecemeal redevelopment already occurring, such as that at St Katherine Docks which had been sold 
to the Greater London Council (GLC), and to enable central government to control the large budgets 
necessary. But the proposals put forward in this first study, to establish a New Town-type 
organisation taking control from Local Authorities, was met by a storm of protest from the Labour-
run borough councils and local communities. Partly as a result the Docklands Joint Committee (DJC), 
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made up of representatives from the Boroughs, GLC, industry, community groups and key agencies 
such as the Port of London Authority (PLA) was set up in 1974, the same year a Labour Government 
was elected. In 1976 the DJC produced a non-statutory plan, the London Docklands Strategic Plan 
(LDSP), which set out to ‘redress the deficiencies’ of East London by focusing on reviving industrial 
employment and providing housing for the local population.5 
[Insert Map 1] 
Map 1. The London Docklands area and its environs. 
However, by the mid-1970s the PLA found itself in accelerating financial trouble, and this made the 
need for some form of radical action even more acute. The Ministry of Transport estimated that the 
PLA would need a cash injection of between £40m and £60m to keep going until 1980, and that if 
nothing was done about the docks’ labour situation it would continue to need loans and subsidies 
thereafter.6 Furthermore, by 1979 and at the time of the first Thatcher administration’s election, the 
Strategic Plan was falling behind its targets, leading new Secretary of State for the Environment 
Michael Heseltine to claim that to meet this challenge ‘there is a need for a single-minded 
determination not possible for local authorities concerned with their much broader responsibilities’. 
His proposal was to create Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) ‘modelled on the New Town 
Development Corporations and... given powers of planning, land assembly and disposal for private 
sector development and a range of other activities’.7 The London Docklands Development 
Corporation (LDDC) was therefore established in 1982 with a remit to regenerate Docklands through 
attracting the private sector to address perceived failures in housing and land markets in the area. 
This was not , of course, the end of the story, although it is the time-period on which this article 
focuses. The LDDC itself until its demise in 1998 went through significant changes from being 
market-driven to embracing ‘social regeneration’ from the late 1980s onwards while post-1998 
successor bodies including Local Authorities, the Greater London Authority (GLA) and other 
regeneration agencies have arguably continued the ‘strategic flexibility’ practiced by the LDDC in 
their efforts to secure further private sector investment.8 
[Insert Table 1] 
Caption: Table 1. Political control of relevant authorities in London Docklands, 1970s-2000s. 
One way of depicting this history is through a succession of different stages or planning ‘eras’ 
running from an apparent consensus in the 1970s, and centring on public sector-led approaches, 
through to the fracturing of such widespread agreement by the free market ideology of the early 
Thatcher years, to the re-establishment from the late 1980s of a new form of consensus built on 
public-private partnerships and planning gain.9 While useful (and see Table 2 for a summary of these 
different approaches) defining such eras can be problematical. Firstly, it can over-simplify the factors 
in play. Carmona for example employs only two criteria to define his eras: the shifting balance 
between plan- or opportunity-based, and between state- or market-controlled, approaches.10 It can, 
secondly, suggest that such eras are monolithic, represented by only one approach which is then 
superseded by another and that the progression from one to another proceeds in linear fashion.11 
Thirdly, it can ignore the role of ideology and history in the ex post facto ascription of new 
justifications and explanations to the past.12  
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[Insert Table 2] 
Caption: Table 2. A short history of London Docklands development. 
 
There is a related tendency in such schematics to depict the Docklands as it emerged under the 
LDDC as an ideal type of ‘three-D Thatcherism’  and the physical legacy of her politics: a view 
underlined repeatedly in commentaries after her death in 2013. As one author has put it, ‘where a 
maze of derelict warehouses and old cranes once testified to Britain's decline, glass skyscrapers 
teeming with traders now dominate London's docks, a metaphor - for good and ill - for Margaret 
Thatcher's free-market revolution’.13 In addition, the LDDC itself, through a series of monographs 
and a legacy website, has attempted to reinterpret the past into a narrative of success.14 It is 
therefore timely to work towards a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of the planning of 
Docklands  and to look again at the crucial period between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s when the 
coming together of actually much more complex transformations in industrial policy, planning and 
political ideology transformed Docklands. In our attempt to do so, we draw on work addressing 
policy ‘assemblage’, placing the emphasis on how different ideological and administrative elements 
were brought together, or assembled, in a contingent and uneasy way. This involves what Eugene 
McCann and Kevin Ward have termed the ‘composite and relational character of policies and cities... 
[involving] various social practices that gather, or draw together, diverse elements of the world into 
relatively stable and coherent “things” [that are]... unexpected and nonlinear’.15  
 
Such work includes study of the intellectual, temporal and spatial contradictions, contestations and 
tensions that exist within such assemblages and thus moves away from any sense of monolithic 
‘eras’. Our emphasis on overlapping chronological phases, revealing both complexity and specificity, 
might be thought of as a temporal counterpoint to those spatial approaches that, even at the time, 
rejected any simple set of causes or indicators as either causing or demonstrating Docklands 
redevelopment. Darrel Crilley’s late 1980s attack on John Short’s use of class as the key element in 
Docklands’ transformation is a case in point: our argument similarly problematizes the idea of 
“ideology” or “politics” as a privileged or sufficient explanator of urban regeneration on its own.16 
This article instead focuses on the work (or practices of assemblage) of policymakers and others in 
bringing and holding together the sheer volume of intellectual and practical elements that this 
labour entailed.17 It is a task that has been assisted by the availability of new documentary sources 
consisting of material released under the 30 year rule in the National Archives and previously 
restricted material from the LDDC now in the London Metropolitan Archives, as well as 
autobiographies and other reflections from key actors at the time. In addition fieldwork in the form 
of interviews with key actors and a workshop bringing together a range of those active at the time 
has also been undertaken.18  
 
Docklands Planning Prior to the LDDC 
 
As outlined in the introduction, two major regeneration efforts preceded the creation of the LDDC, 
differing in respect of key policy areas and the proposed governance arrangements. The Docklands 
Study Team, consisting of high-ranking officers from central government, the GLC and the five 
Docklands boroughs (Greenwich, Lewisham, Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets), reported in 
1973 and produced 18 different scenarios that might exist in or about 1990, with between 25,000 
and 45,000 new industrial jobs in the area, as well as between 12,000 and 50,000 new office jobs 
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and including such flights of fancy as a safari park in the Victoria Dock.19 They gave their five 
preferred alternatives five evocative names: ‘Waterside’; ‘Thames Park’; ‘East End Consolidated’; 
‘Europa’; and ‘City New Town’. However the essential choice was between two: City New Town and 
East End Consolidated, with the latter ‘subtly presented as an unattractive alternative’ depending as 
it did on public housing and industrial employment (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).20 The favoured 
option, City New Town, involved 60,000 new service sector jobs and only 1,000 new industrial jobs. 
A population of 142,000 was envisioned, improving the ‘social balance’ in Docklands with a 50/50 
public and private housing split plus an East-West spinal public transport route and associated 
shopping, services and open space. Ostensibly chosen via the application of ‘rational’ planning 
criteria based on identified problems such as housing, employment and transport, even the study 
team admitted they placed at least equal weight on the views of their clients, the Conservative-led 
GLC.21  
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Caption: Figures 1 and 2. ‘East End Consolidated’ and ‘City New Town’ plans for London Docklands, 
1973. 
 
Source: London Docklands Study Team, Docklands: Redevelopment Proposals. The authors are 
grateful for the permission of Bromley Borough Council (as the GLC’s successor body for copyright) 
and the London Metropolitan Archives to reproduce these images.   
 
These plans were opposed by a number of local groups, who proselytized vociferously and 
effectively in favour of their own vision for Docklands. Coalitions of activists opposed the idea of a 
New Town in Docklands when giving evidence to House of Commons inquiries into the matter.22 The 
Joint Docklands Action Group became the umbrella grouping which represented their views to 
government, opposing the 1973 plans since ‘it believed they would not significantly benefit the 
existing residents and workers of East London’. They called instead, for instance before the House of 
Commons Expenditure Committee in 1979, for industrial re-location to Docklands, and the 
construction of affordable housing developments that would re-house existing, rather than 
incoming, residents.23 Planners and officialdom alike harboured doubts about their apparent 
spontaneity. David Eversley, who had himself worked as one of the GLC’s Chief Planners, dismissed 
such groups as led by figures ‘from outside the community… using local residents as “front men” for 
their activities’, often with ‘principal link[s] to various left wing organisations’, ‘other young people 
mainly of upper middle class origin who… often had little knowledge of what was involved’, 
circulating propaganda written in ‘virtually unintelligible sociological jargon’,24 a view shared by 
some local residents.25 
 
The Heath Government of 1970-74 had been strongly interested in the idea of a ‘special agency’, 
initially to be set up under, and be responsible to, the GLC – controlled at this point by the 
Conservatives. But the idea proved impossible to sell to the five local authorities involved, all of 
which were governed by the Labour Party. Geoffrey Rippon, himself a member of the London County 
Council in the 1950s and now Secretary of State for the Environment, did consider legislating to set 
up a Development Corporation, along modified New Town lines. He prepared to publish a White 
Paper proposing just this in the summer of 1973.26 The boroughs, instead, ‘very strongly urge[d] on 
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Ministers’ the concept of a statutory joint committee of all the councils involved – which led to the 
setting up of the DJC, its sixteen members drawn equally from the GLC and the boroughs.27 A new 
Labour administration at County Hall furthermore announced that it was scrapping the consultants’ 
study, which it condemned as a ‘series of dreams’. Instead, the GLC placed a renewed emphasis on 
‘council housing, industrial employment and, if possible, keeping docks... working’ .The DJC was 
granted powers of strategic planning and development control by the boroughs, but its main task 
was to draw up a non-statutory strategic plan for the area fitting between the GLDP and the 
borough’s own plans.28 
 
So the first attempt to ‘assemble’ Docklands along a particular trajectory was replaced by a second 
attempt that focused on inter-borough regeneration from the bottom up during a renewed period of 
Labour government at Westminster. In 1976 the Docklands Joint Committee published the London 
Docklands Strategic Plan, the explicit aims of which were ‘to redress the housing, social, 
environmental, employment, economic and communications deficiencies of the Docklands areas the 
parent Boroughs’.29 Economic policies were not based on the service sector but on the stabilisation 
of industrial employment and the attraction of new industry: the docks still operational in 1976 were 
assumed to remain so for the life of the plan. 23,000 new houses were envisaged with a mix of 50% 
publicly rented, 30% shared ownership (including housing associations) and 20% owner-occupied. 
These were to be built in neighbourhoods surrounding individual centres spaced along the riverside. 
New transport in the form of an East-West Underground link, roads and river crossings would allow 
the development of a ‘grid’ of north-south, as well as east-west, industrial and commuting links 
across the area (see Figure 3 and Figure 4).30  
 
[Insert Figure 3] 
Source: Docklands Development Team, Housing. 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
Caption: Figures 3 and 4. Docklands Joint Committee plans for the area, 1976. 
 
Source: Docklands Development Team, Transport. The authors are grateful for the permission of 
Bromley Borough Council (as the GLC’s successor body for copyright) and the London Metropolitan 
Archives to reproduce these images.   
 
However, bringing and holding together all the elements of the policy assemblage needed to deliver 
this vision proved difficult. In terms of physical space, the GLC and the boroughs initially continued 
to acquire land from the PLA with the London and Surrey Docks being bought and filled. The DJC 
expected that the Community Land Act of 1976 – which allowed councils to buy up land at prices 
based on current, rather than hoped-for, uses, and exempted local authorities from paying tax on 
land they acquired – would enable them to assemble the large areas of derelict land earmarked for 
development.31 A Docklands Land Board (DLB) was established in 1977 to buy up land in this way, 
and the Department of the Environment (DoE) indicated that it was willing to allow loan sanctions 
for the purchase of 224 acres for subsequent development. The DLB thought it might then be able to 
initiate development on a similar basis to the post-war New Towns. But the Act proved an 
inadequate tool, and by the time of its dissolution in 1980 the Board had only acquired 3.3 acres. 
These administrative arrangements were, furthermore, only bureaucratic elements intended to 
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deliver a set of plans that were supposed to be constructed from the bottom up, as well as the top 
down. The DJC intended that local residents should be involved in the planning process through local 
Action Groups, and a ‘Docklands Forum’ ‘representing a wide cross-section of interests’. There was 
an Action Group for each constituent area of the area under study by the DJC, meaning that there 
were six in total (for Lewisham, the Isle of Dogs, the Surrey Docks, the Mile End/ East End Docks 
area, Newham and Greenwich).32 The Forum did not, however, always work as well as the DJC’s 
proponents hoped it might, for it was a relatively large body, operating across a very wide and 
disparate area. It also became more bureaucratic as time wore on, appointing an Executive 
Committee and reorganising its officer structure on a more complicated basis during 1978. One 
chairman of the Docklands Forum indeed thought that his group ‘made no significant impact on 
either general policies or on particular decisions’.33 
 
The achievement of the DJC’s aims was therefore highly constrained. While the DJC had pressed 
ahead with a programme of practical work, such as dock filling, and hoped to build projects that had 
already been given planning approval, a 1978 review showed that targets were not being met. As 
public finances were not forthcoming there was greater reliance on the private sector. The inclusion 
of schemes such as a ‘Trade Mart’ in Surrey Docks which favoured service sector employment and 
provided no housing is an example of how the aims of the Strategic Plan were bypassed: as a result, 
it became a ‘compromise between the interests of private developers and the local workforce and 
community in Docklands’.34 Such travails demonstrate that the changes in the trajectory of 
regeneration in Docklands were not solely attributable to top-level political change and that even 
within the social-democratic ‘era’ there were a variety of different approaches emerging in tension 
with each other: the original plans for a New Town-style redevelopment and an emphasis on service 
industries; a period of consultative local co-operation; and a later 1970s return to an increased 
emphasis on private sector initiative.  
 
Potential responses to this were threefold. There were, first, attempts to refocus the inter-authority 
approach even further on profit-seeking activities. The five borough authorities involved appointed 
Industrial Liaison Officers to assist with employment and investment work, and the GLC re-
orientated some of the efforts being made by its own Industrial Centre eastwards.35 A Docklands 
Development Organisation (DDO) was set up, aimed at attracting more private sector development. 
One of the first responses of the DDO was to revise the LDSP population targets down, call for more 
commercial development and increase the target for private investment to 70%. Under the 1978 
Inner Urban Areas Act (IUAA), Docklands became a partnership area with a Partnership Board 
alongside the DJC. As Brownill has previously stated, though discourses of ‘partnership’ imagined co-
operation between local authorities, the private sector and local communities – a quite different 
emphasis from later Thatcherite cadences – such concepts could still ‘be seen as the first move 
towards the centralised and private sector regime in Docklands’, as the emphasis was on bringing in 
private finance and funds for housing and land purchase were not available through the IUAA.36 In 
contrast an alternative strategy was being put forward by local organisations and trades unions, as 
well as some local politicians, calling for much greater central government investment utilising 
Labour’s new National Enterprise Board and concerting the disposal of public land. These 
alternatives were to culminate in the policies of the GLC from 1981 onwards which stood in such 
direct opposition to the LDDC. The 1981 election manifesto for a ‘socialist policy for the GLC’ 
contained five pages on Docklands and included calling for the principles of the LDSP to be upheld, 
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as well as pledging GLC support for ‘opposition to the UDC’.37 The third alternative, to which we now 
turn, was to create new and equally radical, but market-orientated, solutions. 
 
The Creation of the LDDC 
 
The Thatcher Government moved very rapidly to establish its new Inner City policy. The new 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, put a paper to the Economic Affairs Sub-
Committee of the Cabinet in July 1979 outlining proposals for UDCs in London and Liverpool. Keith 
Joseph, in a minute to Thatcher, noted that this ‘radically new approach’ for a ‘single-minded 
development agency’ received a ‘rapturous reception’ but added it would no doubt have 
implications for public expenditure and urban and regional policy.38 Heseltine was keen to make an 
announcement in early September: an inter-departmental working party was set up to make 
recommendations on a wide range of aspects including housing, consultation, industrial policy and 
planning powers. This had done sufficient work for Cabinet discussions to be concluded and for 
Heseltine to make a statement on 14 September to the Royal Town Planning Institute Summer 
School in York. In this speech he announced the setting up of UDCs on Merseyside and in London. A 
chairman – Nigel Broackes from the property investment conglomerate Trafalgar House – was then 
approached for the LDDC, and his appointment settled by the end of the year.39 This was followed by 
a consultation document issued by the DoE and the creation of UDC powers in Part XVI in a new 
Local Government, Planning and Land Act, passed in 1980.40 The designation of the areas to be 
included and the setting up of the Corporations were set out in orders laid before both Houses of 
Parliament in November 1980.   
 
Neither were UDCs the only policy initiative from the Government. The Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, 
had also put forward ideas for Enterprise Zones (EZs), smaller areas in which the ‘red tape’ of 
planning and tax burdens would be lifted from enterprise in order to promote private sector 
investment. The package was eventually settled in Cabinet Committee by the end of February 1980: 
after some wrangling, EZs eventually involved the granting of 100 per cent capital allowances for 
commercial buildings and total rating remission for ten years, as well as the waiving of the normal 
procedures for acquiring planning permission.41 While not included in the initial UDC proposals, the 
designation of the Isle of Dogs EZ in 1982 became a crucial factor in the redevelopment of the area. 
 
UDCs were to be given extensive powers of land assembly and disposal, to take over planning 
control powers from the Local authorities, and to be accountable to a Board appointed by the 
Secretary of State, not the local electorate. Nevertheless the 1980 Act contained sections lifted 
verbatim from New Towns legislation, and in subsequent interviews LDDC officers have confirmed 
the influence of the New Towns as a ‘model’ over what they were trying to achieve in Docklands.42 
The difference was that in this assemblage, development corporations were placed within a very 
different ideological context. Thornley has distinguished three main features of New-Right planning 
at this time.43 Firstly, the neo-liberal domination of decision-making by individual and market criteria 
over collective social or community concerns. Secondly, what he terms ‘authoritarian decentralism’ 
through which the centre appropriates power and then decentralises it, in the case of UDCs through 
the appointment of a board of predominantly private sector interests accountable to the secretary 
of state. Thirdly, there is what Thornley sees as the anti-bureaucratic element and the replacement 
of ‘red tape’ with flexible planning procedures backed by law which allow the private sector room 
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for manoeuvre. Other authors have stressed a fourth element, which is the desire to reduce public 
expenditure and to rely on more private investment and provision.44 
 
But while some of these elements were undeniably present within the UDC proposals, there were 
others in play, increasingly brought into the open during Heseltine’s attempt to steer his proposals 
through Cabinet. First and foremost there was a clash between some of these concepts, especially 
between authoritarian decentralisation, the Thatcher government’s overriding aim of public 
expenditure constraint and the role of markets.45 Contemporary documents reveal that Joseph’s 
Department of Industry was concerned at the implications for regional policy should development in 
the relatively successful economy of London be in effect promoted and subsidised by government, 
as well as the movement of responsibility to the DoE.46 Estimating expenditure was difficult due to 
the fact there were no proposals as yet from the putative LDDCs, and projections varied from £30m-
£85m per year. A working paper setting out a variety of options for Docklands, including keeping the 
DJC and a UDC, spelt out that the UDC was only viable with increased input from the Exchequer and 
the lowest cost options were to keep the DJC or put the Boroughs in control.47 But the extent of 
central government intervention in local economic affairs also posed an intellectual challenge to the 
first Thatcher administration. The Treasury under Howe was also concerned at the implications for 
public spending, as well as possible ‘contradictions’ with its own EZ initiative. Arguably EZs can be 
seen as ‘purer’ form of free-market initiative avoiding the setting up of an agency, which although 
market-friendly, was still part of the state.48  
 
The resolution of this conflict can be explained via a vignette from Heseltine’s memoirs, where he 
recounts a meeting between himself, Howe, Joseph and Thatcher at which objections to UDCs from 
his fellow ministers were over-ruled by Thatcher in response to Heseltine’s assertion (fed to him by 
Reg Prentice, the former Labour MP for East Ham who had defected to the Conservatives) that the 
Docklands local authorities were ‘all run by communists’.49 As Heseltine commented: ‘I had lit the 
blue touch paper. The rocket went off’, with the result that Thatcher’s political priorities about the 
‘enemy within’ and the exclusion of local, particularly Labour, authorities from decision-making 
overrode concerns over public expenditure and new powers for central government. However, the 
stress placed on ‘present arrangements’ in the September statement was insisted on by Cabinet 
members as an attempt to control resources and contain UDC activity to within existing limits.50 
Further, the Treasury made it clear that there would be no more money for Heseltine’s department 
and anything above what would have gone to the DJC would have to be taken from other parts of 
the DoE’s spending.51 From the start tensions were embedded in this assemblage between different 
strands of urban policy contained within the LDDC approach. As Cochrane has noted, and as 
evidenced by the responses of Joseph and Howe, UDCs ‘were not the pure children of Thatcher 
because they drew on a clear cut interventionist agenda’.52 
 
The contradictions in the scope of state activity in this new policy assemblage were added to by ones 
of scale. The practice of ‘authoritarian decentralism’, removing local power to place it in the hands 
of the central state and the private sector, brought with it its own tensions. Most obvious amongst 
these were in relations with the local authorities and the GLC: however, despite being created by 
central government, one of the major features of the LDDC was its fractious relationship with its 
parent. As an illustration of these tensions, examination of archives from the time reveals that there 
was much discussion by civil servants on the extent of powers, responsibilities and spending 
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authority to be given to UDCs. Many within Whitehall imagined the creation of a more traditionally-
minded authority than they initially unleashed: some senior civil servants asked to draw up the 
proposals thought the DJC ‘not so manifest a failure’ as to warrant an alternative, as well as once 
again highlighting the cost implications. In one telling memorandum the consensual DJC was 
preferred, ‘for the alternative is a red-blooded, meat-eating tiger’ that would attack the ‘sacred cows 
of planning, consultation and fair process’ – in many ways the politicians’ intention. Nevertheless, 
presciently, the author commented that the reaction to this would mean the tiger would inevitably 
be watered down to a ‘domesticated she-cat’ in time.53 
 
Civil servants’ caution about future negotiations was entirely warranted. Docklands’ borough 
councils were opposed to the entire concept of a Development Corporation, especially since they 
felt that they had themselves already cleared away many of the structural difficulties of re-
development – drainage, site clearance and the like. They always made clear that they would wait 
until the Royal Assent was granted fully to co-operate with the new Development Corporation. 
Heseltine accepted that they ‘were feeling aggrieved that the decision had been taken to set up a 
UDC in Docklands... without prior consultation’, but in October 1979 impressed on GLC, Lewisham, 
Newham, Southwark, Tower Hamlets and Greenwich leaders that ‘the area... required a centralised 
body with flair, single-mindedness, dynamism and above all concentrated power to act’.54 Still, as 
the same local authority leaders told Heseltine in February 1980: ‘the UDC concept was not one 
which Docklands Leaders accepted readily... Docklands Local Authorities were firmly against the UDC 
proposals and there was going to have to be considerable understanding over the coming months if 
progress were to be made’.55 Greenwich’s Chief Executive summed up the boroughs’ proposed 
counter-offer: ‘a forum for co-ordinating the Council/ local group/ voluntary body interests... to 
disseminate information relating to urban aid and other financial assistance... to provide advice and 
assistance to local groups... to work up jointly proposals for utilising the financial assistance for the 
benefit of the residents’. The DJC would be retained, even if given new powers, under proposals the 
boroughs attempted to popularise with the title Local Democracy Works (Figure 5).56  
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
Caption: Figure 5. Cover of pamphlet arguing the case for keeping the DJC, showing council housing 
under construction in Wapping. 
 
Source: Docklands Borough Councils, Local Democracy Works. The authors are grateful for the 
permission of Greenwich Borough Council to reproduce this image.   
 
The response to these political differences was to appoint Bob Mellish, Labour MP for the 
Bermondsey area of Southwark and a previous Cabinet minister, as shadow vice-chair of the UDC. 
The leaders of the three Docklands authorities were also offered board membership as individuals, 
not as representatives, and had to abide by the regulations of the board in that meetings were 
secret with no published minutes or agendas. However, if this was an attempt to construct a policy 
assemblage which would work it failed. Conflict with the boroughs remained and as local politics in 
some parts of Docklands moved towards the left, Mellish was deselected as an MP for the 1981 
election and the new Leader of Southwark resigned from the Board: the borough then refused to 




Some Whitehall officials had, even so, by now convinced themselves that they had taken the right 
course of action – though for rather more dirigiste reasons than Ministers. As they further concluded 
after their success in convincing the House of Lords Select Committee of the case for a UDC:  
 
Some of the objectives of the LDSP were wrong anyway. The DJC were trying to reinforce the composition of 
the existing community which was based on the docks and associated work. It was not trying to create the 
conditions for growth by way of new or expanding industries. In any case, if it was a national problem then it 
required national money to solve it. In that case, the Government was perfectly entitled to have a say... The 
Boroughs insisted that it was a purely local difficulty but nevertheless wanted the Government to come up 




Similar views were stated at the relevant House of Lords Inquiry. It was claimed that that the 
Docklands boroughs were ‘parochial’, that they could not agree and the DJC did not have the powers 
to deliver. Instead what was needed was a ‘single-minded authority’ which could develop Docklands 
in the ‘national interest’ and bring in the ‘funds and energies of the private sector’.59 Their Lordships 
agreed and made only two caveats in relation to the provision of land for public housing and 
consultation with the boroughs and the Docklands Forum. And so the LDDC was established in July 
1981, assuming its planning powers two months later. This did not, however, end the debates over 
public expenditure, direction and control – in which some Ministers were deeply concerned about 
the spending and legislative implications of Heseltine’s reforming urban agenda, and many officials 
advocated the creation of a new Corporation partly because of exasperation of the boroughs’ 
inaction. There were therefore contradictions of both scale and scope within the newly formed UDC 
policy assemblage. 
 
Rolling Back the State? 
 
These tensions between Whitehall and the LDDC were deep-seated, and continued for much of the 
1980s – partly because the LDDC’s first Corporate Plan and its mapping was so vague and 
unenlightening as to its borders and contours. Reg Ward had been appointed as Shadow Chief 
Executive prior to the House of Lords decision and complained bitterly in March and April 1981 that 
the UDC was not being allowed to operate in its own right: that a ‘conceptual gap’ had opened up 
between the extensive independence the LDDC had been promised, and the ‘double-checking’, 
bureaucratic and ultimately directing role of the DoE. Asked to prepare the first Corporate Plan, 
which set out the aims and objectives of the LDDC and also set out the budget and bid for 
government resources, Ward found most maddening civil servants’ ‘circular’ arguments, insisting 
that the business plan had to be coherent when it came to the rapid collection of enough land for 
development overall, while insisting that each individual project should be tested for its contribution 
to the Corporation’s objectives.60 He argued that it went against the purpose of a UDC to either set 
out detailed plans or to expect the UDC to go through the DoE’s usual project appraisal processes 
and his submitted first document was literally a few scribbles on a map (see Figure 6).  
 
[Insert Figure 6] 
Caption: Figure 6. Reg Ward’s first attempt at defining the area to be covered by the Docklands 




Source: The National Archives, AN 81/215. This material is Crown Copyright and is reproduced with 
the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO) at The National Archives.  
 
Civil servants’ concern was not so much about the niceties of planning but the control over the 
spending of public money: New Towns had significant budgets but they also had definite 
responsibilities. Officials were very worried about the LDDC, minuting that ‘the main problem... is 
the apparent inability of the shadow Corporation to organise itself, and to prepare programmes 
which can start to roll immediately... Mr Ward is unable or unwilling to weld together the 
machinery, and provide the thought out and detailed information needed, if the UDC is to function 
effectively’.61 This memorandum suggested Ward be removed as he was not up to the job, but such 
concerns could also be seen as a response to a perceived challenge to the DoE’s role. Ultimately 
Heseltine came down in favour of his civil servants, arguing that as public money was involved he 
was accountable to Parliament – though he had already asked that the Treasury show some 
flexibility about the financing of initial land vesting, and his civil servants were eventually able to 
reach agreement on this basis. Even so, the reporting system was still thought by the LDDC to be 
causing ‘unnecessary delay’ later in 1981, prompting officials – and Heseltine himself – to offer a 
series of small improvements, such as grouping minor project approvals together on one form.62  
 
It took three attempts to settle an acceptable Corporate Plan, and it was not approved until some 
months after the LDDC had been formally set up having ultimately been drafted with the support of 
further additions to the LDDC officer team. Ward stayed (for the time being, though he was pushed 
out in 1987), but the board and officer team was strengthened in an attempt to make good some of 
these deficiencies, including the appointment of Wyndham Thomas (General Manager of 
Peterborough New Town) as a board member. Interviews with ex-LDDC officers have confirmed this 
early tension between a new breed of ‘swashbuckling’, entrepreneurial civil servants intent on 
putting the ideology of free-market planning into practice and a more cautious central bureaucracy 
carried on for some years.63 Tellingly a video produced by the LDDC at the end of its life, entitled The 
Battle for Docklands, recounts not its battles with the local community but with central government. 
 
The LDDC and the Variants of ‘Anti-Planning’ 
 
The LDDC was possessed of a different vision to the imagined solutions of the 1970s: one that 
involved freedom from – not the necessity of – governmental action and involvement. As Broackes 
wrote in the first annual report: ‘the era of the grand plan has passed’.64 The demands of developers 
would replace needs-led planning based on providing for existing communities: ‘planning without a 
master plan’, in the words of the geographer John Hall.65 Replacing the entire concept of local 
authority leadership and consultation, the new LDDC would now become ‘the local planning 
authority for the whole of its area... and for all kinds of development for which a borough is at 
present the local planning authority’. Flexible strategies to entice private development, as shown in 
the Local Development Framework for the Royal Docks (Figure 7), were to replace detailed land use 
plans.  Indeed the local authorities were conceptualised as being part of the problem, with the 
‘socio-economic’ plans of the Docklands authorities pushing away private pushing out the private 
sector.66 The statutory development plans which gave overall direction would remain within the 
purview of the GLC and the boroughs; but there was no room for doubt that this was a fundamental 
departure from previous practice.67 The boroughs, for instance Newham, were privately assured that 
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‘it should not be assumed that the UDC would want to intervene or displace the local authorities just 
for the sake of it. They would undoubtedly want to see things happen but they would not necessarily 
want to do everything themselves’. Even so, the LDDC was now indisputably the lead planning 
authority: Heseltine asked personally that shops, offices and industrial buildings be taken out of the 
GLC’s purview, along with planning applications and appeals.68 And Newham’s fears were realised in 
1986 when its statutory plan for the Royal Docks area (the South Docklands Plan) was refused 
adoption on the grounds that it contradicted the LDDC’s vision for the area.69 
 
[Insert Figure 7] 
Caption: Figure 7. The LDDC’s ‘flexible’ approach to planning, encapsulated in the Local Development 
Framework for the Royal Docks. 
 
Source: LDDC, Royal Docks Area Development Framework. The authors are grateful for the 
permission of the Housing and Land Directorate of the GLA to reproduce these images.   
 
Heseltine stressed agency rather than ideology in his September 1979 statement, asserting that ‘I do 
not think the present arrangements can meet the particular problems and opportunities’ (emphasis 
added).70 But officials working for the shadow LDDC were freer to articulate other strands in the new 
thinking, particularly those of removing the ‘red tape’ of planning. It appears that from the outset 
Ward, as first Chief Executive of the LDDC, was keen to take the LDDC in just this direction. Thornley 
has cited an early presentation of Ward’s made in 1981, in which he indicated the prime role of the 
LDDC would be the marketing of prime sites and that firms with finance would be given an almost 
free hand, at least until the next general election.71 However, it is clear that while UDCs came to be 
viewed as the ‘flagship’ of this new planning order there were competing and contradictory 
narratives which entered the assemblage and which were to become apparent in LDDC 
developments on the ground. It should also be remembered that the LDDC’s was not the only vision 
for Docklands at the time. The boroughs and local campaigning groups maintained their 
commitment to the LDSP after the establishment of the LDDC. They were supported in this by the 
GLC who were keen to push forward their socialist alternatives to Thatcherite policies. These were 
made real in The People’s Plan for the Royal Docks, which used bottom-up ‘popular planning’ to 
propose alternative uses to what was to become London City Airport based on social housing and 
retaining dock-usage to support a sustainable transport policy (Figures 8, 9a and 9b).72 
  
[Insert Figure 8] 
[Insert Figure 9a] 
[Insert Figure 9b] 
Caption: Figures 8 and 9. The cover and land use maps of the The People’s Plan for the Royal Docks, a 
localist and ‘bottom-up’ alternative to the LDDC’s vision. 
 
Source: Newham Dockland Forum, The People’s Plan. 
 
An example of how the LDDC’s approach to planning asserted itself in the face of these possible 
alternatives is revealed through archival evidence of negotiations between the LDDC and PLA. At the 
setting up of the LDDC the PLA still had extensive landholdings but it was also in financial crisis and 
was negotiating a new five year Corporate Plan with Norman Fowler, the then Transport Secretary.73 
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In the recent past it had been a partner in the DJC both out of self-interest to generate income but 
also out of a particular idea of how a public agency should operate. The PLA’s desire to be a 
landowner with a social conscience and a long-term stake in the area represented a clear alternative 
to the increasingly market oriented and ‘doctrinal’ LDDC. The development of other European port 
cities, for instance Hamburg and Rotterdam, can be seen as having carried through this alternative 
approach with arguably mixed results, but in a way which has been both more inclusive and 
strategic.74 
 
 At a meeting between Broackes and PLA Chairman Victor Paige minuted by Broackes himself, the 
differences between the two agencies were clearly set out.75 PLA policy was to sell the freehold of 
land only for community purposes; for any other commercial uses it would participate in 
development retaining an equity stake. Paige stated that ‘the PLA takes seriously its social 
conscience’ and it wanted to be ‘a land-owner not a property company’. In contrast the LDDC 
wanted land-use to move ‘up-market’ and would sell land on as quickly as it could. Minutes of 
further meetings between civil servants confirm the view that ‘the job of the PLA was to run a port 
not act as a social landowner’.76 To resolve the issue Broackes called for a ‘doctrinal statement by 
government’ and that the matter’ should be settled at Ministerial level’.77 This duly did occur, with 
Heseltine writing to Fowler that he was not prepared to accept anything other than the LDDC vesting 
the PLA’s land and the suggestion that Paige should be appointed to the LDDC board member was 
rejected.78  
 
This vignette also raises the issue of the role of particular actors in the practices of assemblage. The 
fluid situation during the setting up of the LDDC showed there were different possible trajectories on 
offer: social landowner; New Town Corporation; and ‘meat-eating tiger’. Having a Chairman from a 
property company appeared to steer it in a particular direction. The LDDC policy was thus to sell on 
as much of the 173 acres (out of 482 acres) that it owned within the Development Area as quickly as 
possible to the private sector.79 Broackes was aware of the significance of land to the private sector 
and pushed hard to get as much land as possible vested in the LDDC. The PLA’s desire to be a 
landowner with a social conscience and a long-term stake in the area represented a clear alternative 
to the increasingly market oriented and ‘doctrinal’ LDDC. Such incidents show not only how close 
such approaches came to rejection, but also highlight the role of particular actors in the 
indeterminate processes of policy-making.  
 
Although space does not allow us to trace the continuation of these tensions in detail, it is important 
to note that even though they were never resolved despite attempts to do so leading to further 
policy changes. In some senses Howe and Joseph were right; the LDDC might have claimed that it 
was market-led, but it entailed the spending of around £6bn in public money when taking into 
account the enormous public investment in the Docklands Light Railway and the eventual arrival of 
the extended Jubilee Line, as well as the use of extensive planning and land acquisition powers.80 
Such sums led to the ‘reining-in’ of the LDDC with the replacement of Ward as Chief Executive in 
1987, firstly by a previous local authority chief executive, and secondly an ex-DoE mandarin; the 
‘meat-eating tiger’ had indeed become a ‘domesticated she-cat’. Neither did conflict with the 
boroughs, GLC and community dissipate. Indeed as the results of LDDC’s initial strategy epitomised 
by Canary Wharf materialised, with seemingly little to benefit local residents, concerns about its 
appropriateness began to be expressed within central government and led to the Corporation’s 
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‘second wave’ which incorporated social investment, such as at the Britannia Urban Village in the 
Royal Docks  (Figure 10).81 Further the perceived deficiencies in de-regulated planning, such as the 
lack of co-ordination between land-use and planning seen at Canary Wharf which necessitated the 
massive infra-structure investment led to the adoption of what Florio and Brownill have termed 
‘strategic flexibility’.82 This was not a return to a plan-led approach but sought to balance enabling 
private investment with wider considerations and signified a re-emergence of the significance of 
partnership in regeneration: issues which often arose out of the LDDC’s housing activities, to which 
we now turn. 
 
[Insert Figure 10] 
Caption: Figure 10. Britannia Urban Village, a mixed-tenure development built during the LDDC's 
‘second wave’. 
 




Housing was at the nub of what civil servants and planners thought was ‘wrong’ with Docklands in 
the 1970s, and we concentrate here on the housing stock as a way of focusing attention on the 
different solutions on offer at the time. There were two aspects to this. Firstly, as the DJC 
consultative document of 1975 noted, this was one of the worst areas of housing dilapidation 
surveyed in the Ministry of Housing’s 1967 Surveys; local residents put ‘build housing’ right at the 
top of their answers to ‘what needs doing in Docklands?’83 The 1976 DJC plan noted that 40 per cent 
of Docklands residents had thought of leaving the area because of its housing problems.84 The 
central Action Group on London Housing, which drew in officials from across Whitehall, told the 
Joint Committee in October 1975 that ‘adequate provision should be made for housing’ in the Plan. 
‘All speed should be shown in getting land into housing use’, they continued: ‘of all amenities it is 
good housing which most is at a premium in London... [so] the share of land to be dedicated to 
housing should be the greatest which sound planning would allow’. The docklands boroughs had 
severe housing problems across the rest of their purview: Tower Hamlets considered housing stress 
in Spitalfields to be far worse than that in, for instance, Wapping. They were therefore more than 
keen to proceed as quickly as possible, in order to move tenants back into new or reconditioned 
housing in docklands – all an urgency that docklands MPs pressed on Rippon when they met with 
him in April 1973.85 The London Docklands Study of 1973 assumed that progress would ‘overcome 
deficiencies in the housing programmes of the 5 London Boroughs after the first 2 or 3 years of 
redevelopment... indirectly eas[ing] the housing problem in the rest of Greater London’.86  
 
The second issue was the tenure mix and by implication the socio-economic ‘balance’ of the 
population. Due to wholesale post-war reconstruction the vast majority (up to 95% in some areas) of 
Docklands’ housing was local authority owned. For some planners, this presented a problem not 
only of a mono-class area but also in terms of there being no opportunity for residents to achieve 
their ‘aspirations’ for home ownership and in terms of attracting higher income and higher skill 
workers as part of the developing the economy.87 As civil servants noted, there was a perceived 
‘need to provide for local white collar employees who want to be owner occupiers’. This would 
15 
 
involve a large change in tenure type, but ‘without such a reversal, there will not be balanced 
communities’, as one private minute put in during 1976.88 
 
The Docklands Strategy that the DJC decided on during 1975 and 1976 envisaged housing a 
Docklands population of 110,000 with some upward movement in that figure given density rule 
changes later in the decade.89 The tenure balance was set, depending on the area, at 40-50% owned 
by local authorities, 30-40% ‘mid-tenure’ (involving types of shared ownership), and 20% owner-
occupied. The plan recognised that mass private housing was not the solution: ‘to introduce private 
housing into East London on these terms would do little for the vast majority in need of housing’, it 
argued. Instead, untried but innovative forms of equity sharing, housing associations and tenants’ 
co-operatives were suggested which would also be allocated by the local authorities according to 
need.90 The DJC also hoped that the GLC would sell some of the dwellings it built onto the open 
market, so as to ‘go some way towards redressing the imbalance between tenures’.91 However, 
Whitehall planning officials did not envisage a vast role for co-operatives or Housing Associations, 
feeling that these might only ‘play a useful part in catering for special groups, e.g. young single 
workers, students etc.’ Instead the Plan recommended experimentation with ‘equity sharing’ 
schemes between local authorities and groups of individuals, in order to reach the target of 23,400 
new dwellings in Docklands by the 1990s. Just under half of the total new dwellings would, however, 
still be built and owned by local authorities.92 
 
[Insert Figure 11] 
Caption: Figure 11. Luxury flats such as Pan Peninsula proliferated in London’s Docklands during the 
LDDC period. 
 
Source: author photograph. 
 
The LDDC’s approach to housing was very different – the reason why  high-rise, high value, gated 
residential communities such as Pan Peninsula are now so common in Docklands (Figure 11). While it 
also wanted to achieve a ‘balanced’ community, this was to be done through creating a market for 
housing in the inner city by attracting private housebuilders. The problem was therefore not one of 
need but of ‘market failure’. Directions from the DoE to the LDDC were explicit about this new focus. 
Successive drafts of the policy prepared during the summer of 1981 saw Ministers reinforce the 
emphasis on private builders and the role of housing associations.93 Its final drafts laid it down on 
page one that ‘the principal policy objective is to attract private housebuilders to provide houses for 
owner occupation, particularly in the low/ middle income sector’.94 At the House of Lords Inquiry a 
DoE official stated the aim was a tenure mix of 75% for sale.95 Perhaps aware of the opposition this 
might spark, a few days later Broackes – while under pressure at the same inquiry – committed the 
LDDC to a tenure mix of 50% for sale, 25% shared ownership and 25% publically rented. The mix of 
housing tenures, so important in the redevelopment of the whole area, was as much in flux and as 
uncertain as the governance and planning arrangements that remained so multi-faceted. The fact 
that by 1998, when the LDDC closed, the figures were 74% owner-occupied, 23% local authority or 
housing association rented and 3% shared ownership could be read as bearing out the inevitability 
of the market approach.96 However, that would obscure the LDDC’s shift to embrace social 
regeneration in its ‘second wave’ after 1987, when it did did include substantial investment in social 




Conclusions: Eras and Alternatives 
 
The planning theorist Peter Marris has characterised the three stages of Docklands regeneration 
under consideration here as ‘planning by design’, presenting ‘the physical representation of a 
future’, which was first replaced by ‘planning as strategy’ and the ‘co-ordination of actions’, and 
then by ‘planning as entrepreneurship’ via ‘the exploitation of resources and powers to achieve the 
organization’s own designated purpose’.98 But as we have seen – in terms of governance, the likely 
balance between manufacturing and white-collar jobs, and the types of housing tenure encouraged 
– there was little that was inevitable about this process. Nor were these eras distinct; the planning 
visions put forward often held within them contradictory elements and some ideas (for instance the 
concepts of New Town redevelopment and local government co-operation) reappear through time 
either as alternatives or more mainstream policies. Rather than identifying distinct eras, we would 
argue that there has been a constant tension between different approaches to regeneration. These 
have come together in different ways at different times to form provisional and contingent entities 
only to be constantly reassembled through the weight of their internal contradictions and external 
forces. In the process ‘Docklands’ has been made and remade both physically and as an idea.  
 
It could be argued, instead, that policy approaches were assembled around competing ideas of ‘how 
the “problem” was defined’.99 The emphasis on language – protean, complex, and often unclear – is 
instructive. Attempts to regenerate Docklands in the 1970s defined the problem as one finding the 
right forms of state intervention to address economic decline and ‘redress the deficiencies’ in East 
London. These initiatives attempted to fuse traditional regional policy, and the spatial readjustment 
of manufacturing employment, with newer views of participation and citizenship. Not surprisingly, 
given the gaps that opened up between central government, the GLC, the boroughs and the 
residents, this attempt was the cause of as much conflict as it was productive of concert. The 
consequent confusion, and public sector spending constraints, then led to the re-definition of the 
problem as one of ‘market failure’, a failure that had been caused as much by the previous attempts 
at state intervention as economic forces. The solution was the imposition of a Development 
Corporation which itself accepted neither prior technocratic premises about guiding the location of 
jobs, nor the concept of community involvement as it had developed in the late 1960s and the 
1970s. 
 
But the break with the past can be exaggerated, and easy references to ‘Three-D Thatcherism’ can 
be refuted. The LDDC’s nominal creators and overseers in the Thatcher Cabinet were divided as to 
whether spending such large sums and creating new centralised powers was wise; civil servants 
continued to think along New Town lines, partly motivated by frustration at the speed of 
redevelopment up to the early 1980s. The DJC had long attempted to attract or ‘lever in’ private 
sector investment; the LDDC in its turn spent money on social infrastructure.100 Further distinct ‘eras’ 
are the sites of constant re-imaging and reconstruction. The LDDC, for its part, always narrated the 
change in Docklands it initiated as inevitable, treating the area and its past redevelopment as a 
peculiar type of tabula rasa and suggesting that there were no alternatives to its ‘successes’. The 
local population, it claimed, had, ‘albeit grudgingly’, recognised that ‘with the final dock closure... 
future jobs would certainly have to come from new economic structures unrelated to the past’.101 
But these words, from the self-penned obituaries the LDDC commissioned on its demise in 1998, 
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represent a deliberate re-writing of history that excludes the possibility of any alternatives and a 
post-hoc justification of what was a much more disordered and less inevitable process of policy 
assemblage. It was as varied and chaotic a process as were the social changes going on inside 
Docklands, fusing together old elements to make something new. Docklands contained elements of 
central state planning, neo-liberal tax-cutting and strenuous urban activism, just as its people came 
to think of themselves as rather different from suburbanites or gentrifiers across the rest of 
London.102 
 
It was also a process which continued after 1998. Focusing on policy assemblage can help make 
sense of the often neglected post-LDDC regeneration of Docklands when the same tensions between 
levering in private investment and providing social infrastructure are evident.103 The Canary Wharf 
development, for example, has doubled in size since Tower Hamlets reasserted its control over the 
planning of the Isle of Dogs. In 2004 the London Plan under Mayor Livingstone (formerly, as Leader 
of the GLC, a vehement opponent of the LDDC’s policies) identified East London as the priority 
regeneration area for London, creating a  ‘new kind of exemplary, sustainable world class urban 
quarter’ based on promoting major commercial development while extracting value for social 
purposes, for example 50% affordable housing.104 
 
Urban Development Corporations did in fact make a comeback in 2003, but in a very different policy 
assemblage depicted as ‘benign’ agencies working in partnership to assemble the land needed for 
New Labour’s sustainable communities strategy rather than bypassing local government.105 Parts of 
the Victoria Dock in Newham again found themselves in an Enterprise Zone in 2011 as the Coalition 
Government sought to once again remove the burden of planning, but in times of austerity without 
the tax and capital incentives from the 1980s.106  And in 2014 the New Economics Foundation put 
forward an alternative plan for the City Airport in the Royals ‘setting the standard...  for a fairer and 
more sustainable future’.107  As one long-standing actor in Docklands regeneration said, ‘if you stay 
in one place long enough history repeats itself, often in bizarre ways’.108  
 
The history of Docklands therefore shows  not only how the area has been continuously remade but 
also that there were always other alternatives possible, such as more creative uses of public land, 
more effective ways of capturing development value for social uses, more ‘bottom-up’ planning 
procedures, and more sustained approaches to supporting existing port and employment uses which 
would similarly have led to a very different future for Docklands – as has become evident in different 
European cities. Further, and given the continuing fluidity and disputation around the development 
of Docklands and other areas like it, this more nuanced understanding highlights the need 
continually to re-assert and re-assemble alternative visions of regeneration: a task that remains as 
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1968 First upstream dock closes  Start of piecemeal redevelopment at St Katherine Docks by 
then GLC; mix of public and private developments and 
housing. 
1973 Travers Morgan study published  
1974 Docklands Joint Committee 
established 
 
1976 London Docklands Strategic Plan 
published by partnership of Labour 
local authorities and central 
government 
Aimed at ‘redressing the imbalances’ of East London; plan-
led, underpinned by Keynesian economics. 
1979 Announcement of creation of Urban 
Development Corporations in 
Liverpool and London by first Thatcher 
administration 
 
1981  LDDC formally opens for business Governance form and strategies aimed at addressing 
market failure; sparked widespread local opposition. 
1982 Enterprise Zone created on Isle of 
Dogs 
Tax and financial incentives; removal of need for planning 
permission in EZ. 
1984 People’s Plan for the Royal Docks 
published 
Grass roots planning-inspired alternative to London City 
Airport plans launched in Poplar. 
1985  Initial Canary Wharf scheme proposed  
1986 GLC abolished  
1987/88 DLR and London City Airport open 
Olympia and York take over Canary 
Wharf scheme 
Conservative government re-elected 
 
Land and property markets soar; planning gain deals signed; 
second Wave and ‘social regeneration’ begins; LDDC 
Community Services Division established. 
1990  Jubilee Line extension approved  
1992  Economic downturn  
Decision to wind down UDCs taken 
CSD closed; Canary Wharf goes into receivership. 
 
1997 Election of New Labour government  
1998 LDDC closes 
Planning control reverts to Boroughs 
Upturn in markets enables LDDC to leave on a ‘high’; LDDC 
writes its own obituary stressing partnership and outputs. 
 
1999 Greater London Authority established 
with strategic planning powers 
Ken Livingstone elected as Labour  
Mayor 
Jubilee Line opens 
Increasing complexity of governance in the area. 
2003 Sustainable Communities Action Plan 
published by Central Government 
including establishment of Thames 
Gateway Growth Area  
Attention shifted to regional and sub-regional levels; 
ideology of sustainable communities as driver for 
regeneration. 
2004 London Plan published by GLA 
UDCs established by central 
government  in London Thames 
Gateway and Thurrock  
Attempts to merge competitiveness and cohesion within 
overall strategic framework. 
2005 Choice of London for 2012 Olympics 
announced 
Stratford site becomes focus for regeneration. 
23 
 
2008/09 Election of Conservative Boris Johnson 
as new Mayor of London 
Global financial crisis 
Relaxing of some focus on planning gain and social 
objectives; greater reliance on public funding for key sites 
such as Olympics; major schemes such as Silvertown Quays 
stalled. 
2010 Coalition government elected  




2012 Establishment of Mayoral 
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